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Grapheme-color synesthesia is a perceptual experience where graphemes, letters or
words evoke a specific color, which are experienced either as spatially coincident with the
grapheme inducer (projector sub-type) or elsewhere, perhaps without a definite spatial
location (associator sub-type). Here, we address the question of whether synesthesia
can be rapidly produced using a hypnotic color suggestion to examine the possibility of
“hypnotic synesthesia”, i.e., subjectively experienced color hallucinations similar to those
experienced by projector synesthetes. We assess the efficacy of this intervention using
an “embedded figures” test, in which participants are required to detect a shape (e.g., a
square) composed of local graphemic elements. For grapheme-color synesthetes, better
performance on the task has been linked to a higher proportion of graphemes perceived as
colored. We found no performance benefits on this test when using a hypnotic suggestion,
as compared to a no-suggestion control condition. The same result was found when
participants were separated according to the degree to which they were susceptible to
the suggestion (number of colored trials perceived). However, we found a relationship
between accuracy and subjective reports of color in those participants who reported a
large proportion of colored trials: trials in which the embedded figure was accurately
recognized (relative to trials in which it was not) were associated with reports of more
intense colors occupying a greater spatial extent. Collectively, this implies that hypnotic
color was only perceived after shape detection rather than aiding in shape detection via
color-based perceptual grouping. The results suggest that hypnotically induced colors are
not directly comparable to synesthetic ones.
Keywords: hypnosis, synaesthesia/synesthesia, colour/color, embedded figures test, consciousness, mental
imagery
INTRODUCTION
Individuals with grapheme-color synesthesia experience a color
(concurrent) when viewing particular letters, numbers or gram-
matical symbol (inducer). The triggered color experience is
automatic (Mattingley et al., 2001) and the concurrent color is
consistent over time (Simner et al., 2005). The developmental
form of synesthesia emerges early in life (Simner et al., 2006), is
associated with genetic differences (Tomson et al., 2011), and also
structural and functional differences within the brain (Hubbard
et al., 2005; Rich et al., 2006; Rouw and Scholte, 2007; Weiss and
Fink, 2009). Early development may not be the only pathway for
the emergence of synesthetic experiences (unless, of course, one
chooses a priori to limit the term “synesthesia” to particular causal
mechanisms). It has long been known that synesthesia can be
acquired as a result of sensory loss (Armel and Ramachandran,
1999) or temporarily after taking hallucinogenic drugs (Sinke
et al., 2012; Luke and Terhune, 2013). More recently, synesthe-
sia has been reported to arise after brain damage (Ro et al.,
2007) and it has also been suggested that synesthesia may arise,
in blind individuals, after expertise with sensory substitution
technology (Ward and Wright, 2012; see also Ward and Meijer,
2010; Farina, 2013). Finally, it has been claimed that synesthesia
can be induced by hypnosis in hypnotically suggestible individ-
uals (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). In the present study we re-
examine this claim using an “embedded figures” test that has
been widely used in grapheme-color synesthetes. The benefit of
this task is that evidence for synesthesia type behavior would
be measured through task improvement, rather than through
deficits, which are easier to produce through task compliance. The
issue is of theoretical importance because positive findings would
suggest that synesthesia can (at least in some circumstances) arise
from purely functional—rather than structural—brain changes
(Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001) and, moreover, that hypnosis
can create novel perceptual abilities.
Hypnosis is able to alter the phenomenological properties of
participants’ subjective experience (Kihlstrom, 2013; Oakley and
Halligan, 2013). The process of hypnosis can be divided into
induction and suggestion stages. In the induction stage, a putative
“hypnotic state” is induced, or expectations for experiences are
heightened, or the subject is simply alerted that the context
is appropriate for a certain sort of response (e.g., Oakley and
Halligan, 2009; Kirsch, 2011); in the second stage, suggestions are
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given to the participant to experience a (potentially) wide range
of physical and perceptual experiences. There is considerable
variability both in individual hypnotic susceptibility (Bowers,
1998) and in the range of experiences that can be induced.
Importantly, perceptual hallucinations (e.g., hearing music) can
be induced in many participants (Bowers, 1998), providing a
potential link to synesthesia.
Although there is general consensus that hypnosis can alter a
participant’s subjective experience and this can then cause behav-
ioral changes (Kihlstrom, 2013), the neural processes underlying
the functional changes corresponding to hypnotically induced
perception remain poorly understood. One class of theories pos-
tulates that highly hypnotizable people can perform tasks when
hypnotized that they could not do otherwise; for example, distort
perception so that they actually can see non-existent objects in a
way they could not imagine (e.g., Brown and Oakley, 2004) or
fail to perceive stimuli that would otherwise impinge on their
awareness (e.g., pain, Hilgard, 1986). Another class of theories
postulates that highly hypnotizable people cannot do anything
hypnotically that they could not do anyway (e.g., Sarbin and
Coe, 1972; Spanos, 1986). One way of characterizing the latter
class of theory is in terms of “cold control” (Dienes, 2012),
which postulates that the defining feature of acting hypnotically is
simply the incorrect meta-cognition that one is not intending the
(motor or cognitive) action. For example, hypnotic hallucination
of an object on this account is imagining the object, but without
realizing that one is deliberately creating a visual representation: It
appears to occur from other causes and thus appears as perception
(Dienes and Perner, 2007). That is, according to cold control,
hypnotic responding involves no new abilities, just the sense that
an action is happening by itself. The two classes of theory can be
tested by using suggestions for abilities not already possessed by
subjects: If the subject gains abilities they did not have, the second
class of theory is refuted. As we will argue, suggestions for synes-
thetic experiences can serve this function. Synesthetic experience
has some perception-like qualities that may enable enhanced
performance on some tasks (Ramachandran and Hubbard, 2001)
so the question arises whether hypnotically-induced synesthetic
experience is more perception-like than imagined synesthetic
experience.
The generation of synesthetic experience appears automatic,
and automatic processes are partially defined by the difficulty
in controlling them. So the question is raised whether control
of synesthetic experience might be greater hypnotically rather
than non-hypnotically. One developmental form of grapheme-
color synesthesia has been temporarily reduced through hypnotic
suggestion. Terhune et al. (2010) abolished phenomenological
synesthetic experiences in a participant AR, a synesthete who
experiences colors when viewing faces. She had to name the
colors of face stimuli which were presented in either congruent or
incongruent colors. Stroop-like interference effects were evident
in comparison to controls in both reaction times (RTs) and
event related potentials (ERPs) at baseline, however, after a post
hypnotic suggestion these were no longer evident. This indicates
the relevance of synesthesia to testing theories of hypnosis, as well
as for hypnosis for testing theories of synesthesia. We will consider
the converse case to that of Terhune et al., namely, of hypnotically
suggesting a type of synesthesia in people who did not previously
experience it.
To create a “hypnotic synesthesia” one can use the sugges-
tion that when seeing (for example) the letter A the partici-
pant will see a special red color on the page. Supporting this
idea, the phenomenological perception of color (or no color)
has been manipulated using suggestion to add or drain color
from patterned stimuli (Kosslyn et al., 2000). High but not low
susceptible participants all reported being able to see gray-scale
stimuli as colored, and colored stimuli as gray-scale when given
hypnotic suggestion to do so. Further, positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET) indicated changes in cerebral blood flow for left
and right fusiform areas (perhaps corresponding to human V4)
when hypnotic induction was used; however, non-hypnotically
imagining the color changes produced significant changes only
in right fusiform cortex. Hypnosis appeared to influence activity
in color-sensitive areas of the brain in a way imagination alone
could not.
The Kosslyn et al. (2000) study highlights the issue of demand
characteristics in hypnosis research, and the tendency of subjects
to either “hold back” or try harder in different conditions to pro-
duce the pattern of results they perceive as desired (Orne, 1962;
Spanos, 1986). Specifically, the suggestion was more strongly
worded in the hypnosis rather than the imagination condition in
order that subjects would not confuse the two conditions and “slip
into trance” in the imagination condition. Kirsch et al. (2008)
presented the identical color adding or draining suggestions with
or without hypnotic induction, and obtained substantial and
near equivalent changes in color perception in both conditions.
(Further, subjects rated themselves as clearly not hypnotized
in the non-hypnotic condition, indicating that slipping into
trance was not a problem.) Thus, when demand characteristics
were more nearly equalized the difference between hypnosis
and non-hypnosis in subjective experience greatly diminished.
Further, McGeown et al. (2012) showed that similar activation
in visual areas was produced in both the hypnotic and non-
hypnotic conditions. That is, as cold control theory predicts,
hypnotic hallucination with the suggestions used by Kosslyn
et al. (2000) may involve the same visual abilities as imagina-
tion, with the difference being purely metacognitive (Dienes,
2012).
There has been one previous attempt to hypnotically induce
grapheme-color synesthesia (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). Cohen
Kadosh et al. assigned colors to digits either through post-
hypnotic suggestion or learnt association (e.g., 5 = green). Partici-
pants were required to search for an achromatic (black) grapheme
against a colored background. The results showed that search
was impaired when the suggested color was congruent with
the background. However, this result reflects a deterioration in
performance which is easier to simulate (explicitly or implicitly)
than an improvement. Cohen Kadosh et al. requested control
groups to associate the colors with the digits in non-hypnotic
contexts; the non-hypnotic request had no effect on the search
task. However, a non-hypnotic request carries different demand
characteristics from a hypnotic or post-hypnotic suggestion. It
is also unclear from this study whether the performance on
the task does indeed resemble that found in developmental
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grapheme-color synesthesia. To our knowledge only one devel-
opmental grapheme-color synesthete has been tested on a version
of this task (Smilek et al., 2001). While performance of this synes-
thete showed the same trend as the “hypnotic synesthetes” (i.e.,
worse performance on congruent trials, about 20%, compared to
incongruent trials, about 90%), they were far from equivalent in
other respects. Perhaps surprisingly, the manipulation had only a
mild effect on the synesthete (88% correct for congruent and 96%
for incongruent conditions) but a drastic effect on the hypnotized
non-synesthetes. Although direct comparison of proportion cor-
rect trials is difficult due to differences in the task, the comparison
is striking as the synesthete completed a more difficult task than
the non-synesthetes, being required to provide a specific grid
location for the target grapheme amongst distracters. Further-
more, although behavioral similarities between developmental
and hypnotic synesthetes are informative of cognitive processes,
they don’t provide detail of the phenomenological experience
of the participant, an aspect which requires more attention in
hypnotic synesthesia research as well as more generally in neu-
roscience (Lifshitz et al., 2013).
In the present study, we re-examine whether hypnotically
induced synesthetic colors can lead to facilitated performance
on the Embedded Figures Test. Although the test itself (and
the interpretation of the results) is not without controversy, it
has the advantage of predicting that synesthetic (or hypnotically
hallucinated) colors should facilitate rather than impair perfor-
mance on a difficult task, as in the previous study. Moreover,
the test has been utilized in several previous studies involving
grapheme-color synesthetes providing useful benchmark com-
parisons. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) showed synes-
thetes arrays comprising of different graphemes (e.g., 5 s and 2 s)
such that one of the graphemes could be grouped together to form
a shape (e.g., a triangle made of 2 s).1 The task was to identify
the global shape, from four alternatives, given a limited viewing
time of 1 s. Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) found their two
synesthetes to be significantly more accurate in identifying the
embedded shape than controls. They later called this effect “pop-
out” (Hubbard et al., 2006).
The effect was partially replicated by Hubbard et al. (2005)
who noted that the “pop out” effect was not as great as would
be expected for true color. Rothen and Meier (2009) however
did not find an accuracy advantage for synesthetes in compar-
ison to controls for the same task. Ward et al. (2010) partially
supported the original findings with their larger scale replication
study involving a sample of 36 synesthetes. Synesthetes’ accu-
racy at detecting embedded shapes was significantly higher than
controls, though detection rates (41% for synesthetes) remained
significantly below that corresponding to true “pop out”. In this
study, participants were also required to rate the phenomenal
vividness of the synesthetic color and to indicate what percent-
age of the digits appeared as colored. Importantly, the great-
est performance benefits were found for those synesthetes who
experienced a large proportion of the array as colored. This was
interpreted by proposing that synesthetic colors may facilitate
1In their original study there were always three kinds of graphemes presented,
but the test is commonly illustrated by the example of 5 s and 2 s.
local grouping within a spatial window of attention but that
synesthetic colors do not enable pre-attentive pop-out. The latter
interpretation may explain why other studies, based on more
standard visual search paradigms, have often failed to find any
benefit of synesthetic colors in detecting a target achromatic
singleton grapheme (Edquist et al., 2006; Sagiv et al., 2006). That
is, synesthesia may assist local grouping of elements on the basis
of color (facilitating the embedded-figures test) but synesthetic
color may not enable pre-attentive pop-out (on more standard
visual search).
As noted by Ward et al. (2010), grapheme-color synesthetes
differ in the extent to which they perceive (or notice) their
synesthetic colors during this task. Synesthetes classed as “pro-
jectors”, i.e., who report their colors in the spatial loca-
tion of the grapheme, were more likely to report colors
(and showed a trend to do better overall on the task).
The reasons for this are not completely understood (Ward
et al., 2007, 2010). Nevertheless, for the present purposes we
decided to optimize the chances of obtaining a significant
result by instructing our highly hypnotizable participants to
project colors onto the array of graphemes. If hypnotic sug-
gestions can create grapheme-color synesthesia then hypnot-
ically hallucinated colors will facilitate performance on this
task (relative to a no-suggestion control condition). We also
ask, if hypnotic grapheme-color synesthesia can be induced,
are the perceptual reports similar to those of natural synes-
thetes in regards to the vividness and percentage of colored
digits?
METHOD
A counterbalanced two (condition; hypnotic suggestion vs. no-
suggestion) by four (duration; 1, 2, 3 and 4 s) within subjects
design was used.
PARTICIPANTS
Fourteen participants aged 18–42 (M = 23.2, SD = 6.3) were
recruited through the University of Sussex Hypnotic Suscep-
tibility Register. Each had previously been screened using the
Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Susceptibility, form C (Bowers,
1998) with a score of 8 or higher being used to classify them
as highly susceptible. This corresponds to the upper 10% of
people screened. Scores ranged from 8–11 (M = 9, SD = 1.04).
Each was paid £5 for participation, the whole experiment lasting
approximately 1 h. No participant reported having any type of
synesthesia, this was asked prior to testing. The study was granted
clearance from the University of Sussex ethics committee.
MATERIALS
The embedded figures stimuli consisted of four shapes (squares,
rectangles, triangles and diamonds) of number 2 s embedded in
an array of 5 s taken from the Ward et al. (2010) study. Each shape
was made from 6 to 10 target 2 s surrounded by 41 distracter 5 s,
all of which were in black font. Participants sat approximately 85
cm from a 15′′ LCD monitor with 60 Hz refresh rate. The shape
location differed across trials, not always appearing in the center.
E-prime 2.0 software was used to run the experiment.
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FIGURE 1 | An example stimulus (A) as presented (in black font), (B) a
schematic assuming presentation in color, and (C) a partially colored
version in line with the phenomenological reports of projector
synesthetes. Note that stimuli were never presented in color during the
experiment.
PROCEDURE
The experiment was repeated twice within each session, coun-
terbalanced so that half of the subjects completed the hypnosis
condition first, and the other half the control. Participants were
not informed that the study would include hypnosis until just
prior to the hypnosis condition to avoid “hold back” (Stam and
Spanos, 1980) where participants may unconsciously perform
poorer in the baseline condition than they were capable of.
The experiment consisted of four blocks. For half of the
participants the block order was ascending (1 to 4 s duration), for
the other it was descending (4 to 1 s). In the hypnosis condition,
participants received a brief induction (where the participant
was asked to become relaxed and counted down into a deep
hypnotic state) before a hypnotic suggestion to see green for 2
and red for 5 on the monitor where the digit was, very much
like a projector synesthete. Prior to each hypnosis block, the
suggestion was reinforced by requiring the participant to focus
on an individual stimulus digit and attempt to enhance the color.
This was done for both the 2 and 5. If they did not see any
color, they were asked to attempt to visualize it as colored as best
they could. Figure 1 shows how the stimulus would be colored if
color experiences phenomenologically similar to those of natural
projector synesthetes were evoked using hypnotic suggestion.
When completing the control block, no specific instructions were
given on how to complete the task.
SUGGESTION FOR HYPNOTIC GRAPHEME-COLOR
SYNESTHESIA
“Now you will see on the computer screen many 2 s and 5 s.
Whenever you see the digit five you will experience it as having
a special red color. Similarly, whenever you see the digit two you
will experience it as having a special green color. I want you to
make the special color as vivid as possible, actually see the color
FIGURE 2 | Experiment trial sequence. For response 1, shapes (square,
rectangle, diamond and triangle) were presented with response keys
underneath (keys 1–4). Response 2, was measured using a six point scale
(1 = no color, 6 = very vivid color) followed by response 3, the percentage
of digits within the array which were colored which was typed by the
participant.
there. Soon you will be presented with a screen containing both 5’s
and 2’s. You will be able to see the 5’s as vividly red and the 2’s as
vividly green. On each trial there will be a green shape made up of
2’s. You must select the shape you see. The trials will be presented
for 1, 2, 3 or 4 s. Is that clear? Ok we can start”.
An example trial was given at the start of each block where they
were reminded to find the shape made of 2 s, and the responses
required. Each trial was preceded by a central fixation cross for
1 s. The stimulus was then displayed for 1, 2, 3 or 4 s depending
on the block, followed by a blank screen containing instructions
to respond using a four-alternative forced choice to indicate the
shape (square, rectangle, diamond or triangle). Following this,
they were asked to rate their subjective experience of color during
the trial display on two scales. Specifically, they were asked to
rate the vividness of any perceived colors (1 = no color, 6 =
very vivid color) followed by the percentage of digits within the
array which were colored. The fixation cross then appeared to
signal the start of the next trial, see Figure 2 for trial sequence.
Accuracy was emphasized and participants were aware that the
proceeding trial did not begin until a response had been made
for the current trial. On completing the hypnosis condition, the
suggestion was removed (by stating that numbers no longer had
any special colors, and appear as they did before any suggestion
was given) then the participant was counted out of hypnosis.
RESULTS
ACCURACY OF TARGET DETECTION
The accuracy data were measured using percentage accuracy
and were analyzed as a 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA con-
trasting condition (presence/absence of hypnotic suggestion) and
duration of stimulus (1–4 s). The main effect of duration was
significant (F(1.78, 22.13) = 45.16, p< 0.001) with pairwise compar-
isons using Bonferroni adjustment showing significant differences
between all durations (p < 0.001) other than between 3 and
4 s (p = 0.13) due to accuracy improving when the arrays were
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 220 | 4
Anderson et al. Hypnotically-induced synesthesia
FIGURE 3 | Shape detection accuracy for control and hypnosis
conditions across stimulus durations (1–4 s). Error bars represent 1 SEM.
presented for longer durations (1 s M = 46.6%, MSE = 3.0; s
M = 61.1%, MSE = 4.8; 3 s M = 74.0%, MSE = 4.5; 4 s
M = 79.1%, MSE = 5.3). The main effect of condition was not
significant (F(1, 13) = 0.62, p = 0.45): accuracy for the control
condition (M = 67.2%, MSE = 5.5) was similar to that in the
hypnosis condition (M = 63.2%, MSE = 3.9). The interaction
was also not significant, with accuracy being similar between
control and hypnosis conditions for each duration (F(3, 39) =
0.88, p = 0.46). This data is depicted in Figure 3. To determine
whether the lack of main effect of condition reflected insensitive
data, or supported a null hypothesis, we used a Bayes factor
analysis (Dienes, 2011). Whereas significance testing only allows
the null hypothesis to be rejected, Bayes factor analysis also
allows the null hypothesis to be supported (Kass and Raftery,
1995). If the Bayes factor is less than 1/3 there is substantial
evidence for the null over the specified alternative; if greater
than 3, substantial evidence for the alternative; otherwise the
data are insensitive in distinguishing the two hypotheses. Ward
et al. (2010) found that synesthetes were better than normal on
this task by 10%; thus this was used as the standard deviation
of a half-normal to represent an alternative hypothesis that the
hypnosis suggestion created a genuine synesthesia (as per the
guidelines in Dienes, 2011 Appendix). With an actual mean
difference of −4% (SE = 5.1%), the Bayes factor is 0.28, i.e.,
there was substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, that there
is no difference between percentage accuracy for the hypnosis vs.
control condition.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REPORTS
We next considered the extent to which the participants expe-
rienced colors during the task. Table 1 shows the number of
trials in which color was perceived, the average vividness of colors
reported by each participant, and the percentage of graphemes in
the array that were perceived as colored. These data are reported
only for the hypnotic suggestion condition. Twelve out of the 14
participants experienced some color during the hypnosis con-
dition. For those who did experience color, the proportion of
digits and intensity in which they saw color was extremely variable
across participants.
A one-way ANOVA comparing intensity ratings across stim-
ulus duration was not significant (F(1.45, 18.87) = 0.19, p = 0.76):
that is, intensity ratings were similar across all durations (1 s
M = 2.29, MSE = 0.33; 2 s M = 2.41, MSE = 0.39; 3 s M =
2.38, MSE = 0.40; 4 s M = 2.38, MSE = 0.42). (Note that Ward
et al., 2010 reported a similar average vividness rating, 3, for
genuine synesthetes.) Similarly, a one-way ANOVA comparing
percentage of graphemes perceived as colored across stimulus
duration was not significant (F(1.52, 19.73) = 0.11, p = 0.84) with
comparable percentage of grapheme appearing as colored across
all durations (1 s M = 25.72%, MSE = 7.64; 2 s M = 26.25%,
MSE = 7.68; 3 s M = 24.99%, MSE = 7.72; 4 s M = 24.75%, MSE =
7.57) (Ward et al., 2010 reported a similar percentage, 30%,
for genuine synesthetes). The duration of stimulus presentation
did not substantially affect the phenomenological experience of
color.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCURACY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
REPORTS OF COLOR
In order to better understand the role, if any, that color experience
played in shape detection the relationship between accuracy and
the phenomenological color reports was explored.
For these analyses, the participants were divided by a median
split according to the number of trials in which they reported
color experiences thereby creating two groups: many or few color
responses to the color suggestion.
There is evidence for a relationship between accuracy and
phenomenological report when trials are grouped by accuracy.
Participant 10 who never experienced colors had 100% accuracy
for the 4 s duration block preventing comparison between cor-
rect and incorrect trials; after excluding this participant there
remained six participants in the group who experienced few
colors and seven in the group who experienced many colors.
Using phenomenological ratings (mean intensity, mean number
of graphemes perceived as colored) as the dependent variables
a 2 × 2 × 4 ANOVA was conducted contrasting group (many
vs. few color-responses), accuracy (correct vs. incorrect trials)
and duration (4 levels). The data are summarized in Figure 3.
For intensity, there was a significant interaction of group X
accuracy (F(1, 11) = 5.09, p = 0.045). All other main effects and
interactions were not significant. The interaction was analyzed
further by simple effects of accuracy for each group. For the
group who experienced few colors, the effect of accuracy was
not significant (F(1, 5) = 0.016, p = 0.71) however for the group
who experienced many colors this main effect was significant
(F(1, 6) = 6.32, p = 0.046) as more vivid colors were reported for
accurate compared to inaccurate trials. This is summarized in
Figure 4.
For the percentage of graphemes perceived as colored, there
was again a significant interaction of group X accuracy (F(1, 11) =
5.80, p = 0.035). The other main effects and interactions were not
significant. A simple effects analysis indicated that for the group
who experienced few colors, the effect of accuracy was not signif-
icant (F(1, 5) = 0.51, p = 0.51) whereas for the group who experi-
enced many colors it was significant (F(1, 6) = 6.51, p = 0.043) with
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Table 1 | Summary of subjective color experiences for each participant for the hypnosis condition only in descending order from the
participant who experienced color for the most trials to least.
Part. number % Colored trials % of Graphemes perceived as colored (all trials) Average intensity (all trials)
1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s
11 100 52 57 49 41 3.96 3.96 3.68 3.79
2 99 63 80 81 81 3.75 5.04 5.04 5.46
8 97 24 37 39 41 2.64 3.57 3.89 4.25
17 97 90 60 56 58 4.32 3.89 3.00 3.07
6 96 37 34 38 42 3.07 3.29 3.32 3.89
12 83 47 61 67 61 3.50 3.89 4.61 3.64
7 81 7 3 6 5 1.50 1.25 1.75 1.50
1 51 29 27 10 1 2.61 2.32 1.54 1.14
16 29 3 7 3 5 1.21 1.39 1.25 1.32
15 14 1 0 2 10 1.11 1.04 1.11 1.29
3 12 7 0 0 0 1.43 1.00 1.00 1.00
14 1 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.04 1.11 1.00
9 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
10 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
The table shows the percentage of trials where a color was reported, average intensity (1 = no color, 6 = vivid color) and percentage of graphemes within the array
perceived as colored.
more colors being reported for accurate opposed to inaccurate
trials. The data are summarized in Figure 5. Together, the results
from Figures 4 and 5 show that participants who saw many colors
had more intense and widespread phenomenological color expe-
riences for trials in which they correctly compared to incorrectly
identified the embedded shape.
Although the different groups report different levels of color
intensity and disparity on correct vs. incorrect trials, the overall
number of correct trials didn’t differ according to these groups.
A 2 × 4 repeated measures ANOVA with percentage correct as
the dependent variable contrasting group (experiencing few vs.
many colors) and duration of stimulus (1–4 s) was conducted,
considering only the hypnotic-suggestion condition. This data is
summarized in Figure 6. The main effect of duration was signif-
icant (F(1.67, 20.09) = 18.88, p < 0.001) with accuracy improving
as stimulus duration increased. The interaction between group
and stimulus durations was not significant (F(1.67, 20.09) = 0.31, p
= 0.70). Importantly, the difference in accuracy for the hypnosis
block between those who experienced many (M = 61.7%, MSE
= 5.7) and few (M = 64.7%, MSE = 5.7) color responses to
the synesthesia suggestion was not significant (F(1, 12) = 0.13, p
= 0.72). To interpret the non-significant result, a Bayes Factor
analysis was conducted. Again a half-normal distribution was
chosen to test the alternative hypothesis that the group who
experienced many vs. few colors performed better, representing
a real synesthesia like behavioral advantage in those who had
phenomenological experience of the colors. As Ward et al. (2010)
measured a 10% accuracy advantage for synesthetes, this was used
as the SD. With a mean difference of −3, and MSE of 9.5 the
resulting Bayes Factor was 0.58 which is between 1/3 and 3 and
therefore indicates insensitive data.
DISCUSSION
We aimed to determine whether hypnotic synesthesia was simi-
lar either behaviorally or phenomenologically to developmental
synesthesia through measuring accuracy and color experience
during an embedded figures task with and without hypnotic
suggestion. Under the hypnotic suggestion the phenomenology
of the participants was similar to that documented for synes-
thetes. Specifically, they tended not to perceive the entire array
of graphemes as colored and the subjective intensity ratings were
similar to those reported by synesthetes. However, the behavioral
advantage previously found for synesthetes was not found under
hypnotic suggestions, even when one only considers those sub-
jects who responded strongly to the specific suggestions. Further
analyses (using Bayes factors) suggested that this was not merely
due to a lack of sensitivity. As such, our conclusion is that hyp-
notically induced grapheme-color experiences are not equivalent
to those in developmental synesthesia.
On first impressions, this result seems at odds with Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2009), who found that hypnotically suggested
synesthesia results in similar performance to developmental
synesthetes, showing a deterioration in the ability to detect an
achromatic grapheme when the concurrent matched the back-
ground color. However, because this study predicted an impair-
ment (as opposed to an enhancement), their task is potentially
more susceptible to demand characteristics. We note that the
experimenter in the present study was not blind to the experi-
mental condition. However, the principal effect (if any) of lack of
blindness would be to amplify demand characteristics, which we
have argued are less likely to apply in our study than in Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2009). The combination of a strong behavioral
effect in Cohen Kadosh et al., and none at all in our study, is most
simply explained by subjects responding according to how they
believe they should, without hypnotically-induced alterations in
perceptual abilities. This claim is entirely consistent with subjects
in both studies having subjectively compelling experiences.
It is important to note that the ability to respond to the synes-
thesia suggestion was very variable across our participants. This
is perhaps not surprising since perceptual hallucinations are diffi-
cult to evoke even in highly hypnotizable subjects (Bowers, 1998).
It should also be noted that many developmental grapheme-color
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FIGURE 4 | The mean intensity of colors (1 = no color, 6 = vivid color)
reported for trials in which the embedded figure was correctly or
incorrectly detected dependent on whether the participant saw many
colors or few colors. Error bars represent 1 SEM.
FIGURE 5 | The percentage of graphemes within the array being
reported as colored for trials in which the embedded figure was
correctly or incorrectly perceived. Error bars represent 1 SEM.
synesthetes fail to report colors during this task, at least during
brief (1 s) presentations of the array (Ward et al., 2010). The
strength of subjective experience of the colors was comparable
to that of synesthetes. Anecdotally, some of our participants
noted that the hypnotically suggested colors appeared to diminish
over time. To reduce the impact of this, the suggestion was
reinforced between blocks to sustain the colors but several partic-
ipants struggled to maintain the suggestion all the same. Future
research should combine extensive training of grapheme-color
pairings (e.g., Rothen et al., 2011) with subsequent hypnotic
suggestion.
If (at least some) of our hypnotized participants reported
color experiences then why didn’t this help them to detect the
embedded figure? One possibility suggested by our results is
that the color hallucinations are primarily added after grapheme
(and global figure) identification or, relatedly, that the “task” of
adding color visualizations competes with the primary task of
finding the embedded figure. This is supported by the analysis in
which participants were divided (by median split) according to
FIGURE 6 | Shape detection accuracy for lots and little color
responders during the hypnosis condition across stimulus durations
(1–4 s). Error bars represent 1 SEM.
whether they reported many or few color visualizations. For the
half of participants who experienced many colors, significantly
more vivid colors were reported for accurate compared to inac-
curate trials. This difference was not evident in the group who
did not experience much color, perhaps due to a floor effect
given that so little color was reported by these participants. The
enhanced color experience for correct compared to incorrect trials
for those who did experience color may reflect the ease with
which the colors could be projected onto the graphemes by the
participant. In this view, once the shape has been detected, the
identity of digits within the array can more easily be inferred,
potentially allowing easier visualization of the spatial localiza-
tion of the red and green colors. In trials in which the shape
has not been detected, the participant is performing two tasks
at once; the conscious task of identifying the shape and the
“unconscious” task of projecting colors onto black graphemes.
The process of binding the grapheme with the concurrent color
does not seem to occur as automatically in hypnotically sug-
gested synesthesia, as compared to developmental synesthesia.
Indeed, there is evidence that many hypnotic responses take up
capacity by virtue of being hypnotic (Hilgard, 1986; Tobis and
Kihlstrom, 2010; Wyzenbeek and Bryant, 2012; contrast Woody
and Bowers, 1994). Developmental and artificially induced vari-
ants of synesthesia (i.e., hypnotic or drug induced) may be
different. Auvray and Farina (in press) have explored this issue,
and using their characterization of developmental synesthesia (as
satisfying the criteria of the pairing of an inducer with a con-
scious concurrent, the idiosyncratic nature of the concurrent, and
the concurrent being produced automatically and consistently)
they have suggested hypnotic synesthesia satisfies the require-
ments of having a concurrent paired with an inducer, in an
idiosyncratic and automatic way, but that consistency requires
further investigation. Further, they suggest that the concurrent
may be produced by imagery. Our results support a limited
similarity between developmental and hypnotic synesthesia, and
showing that despite the phenomenology, the concurrent may
not be automatically produced (as shown by a lack of behavioral
improvement).
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How is it possible that our participants were able to generate
color experiences at all (assuming, that is, that their subjective
reports had some basis)? One possibility is that it relies on
mechanisms normally used to support visual imagery. How-
ever, we did not assess this directly in our research. Other
research suggests that there are individual differences between
high and low hypnotizable subjects in the tendency to employ
imagery in suitable contexts (e.g., Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974;
Hilgard, 1979; Wilson and Barber, 1982; Roche and McConkey,
1990; Lynn and Green, 2011). However, the tendency to employ
imagery in certain contexts may reflect strategic differences
rather than ability differences given that high susceptible partic-
ipants are not especially quick at visual information processing
(Acosta and Crawford, 1985; Friedman et al., 1987) and are
not especially high in rated imagery vividness (Jamieson and
Sheehan, 2002; though compare the feats of imagery achieved
by high but not low susceptible subjects in Mazzoni et al.,
2009). These suggestions are tentative given that we did not
run low hypnotizable subjects. Further, measuring the men-
tal imagery abilities of participants would help clarify to what
extent participants are able to use mental imagery to complete
the tasks and how this relates to the individual profiles of
hypnotic suggestibility (Cardeña, 2005; Terhune and Cardeña,
2010).
The lack of behavioral advantage for hypnotic synesthetes
can be taken as evidence against functional similarity between
hypnotic and natural synesthesia, but by the same token it
provides support for the Cold Control theory of hypnosis (Dienes
and Perner, 2007), and the class of theories which postulate no
special ability is gained when an action is performed hypnotically
(e.g., Kirsch and Lynn, 1999). Cold Control theory states that the
subjective lack of volition in hypnosis is due to not forming the
higher order thought (HOT) linked to the intention. In this sense,
someone who responds to the suggestion “lift your arm” could
lift their arm but not have the HOT “I am lifting my arm”. If this
theory holds, then participants should not be able to perform
better in the hypnosis block then they do in the control block.
Our data indeed support this inference. Theories that postulate
that hypnotic hallucination is perception-like in a way that goes
beyond normal imagery (e.g., Brown and Oakley, 2004) are
challenged by the current results.
In summary, hypnosis can induce verbal reports of phe-
nomenological experience of grapheme-color synesthesia similar
to those provided by developmental grapheme-color synesthetes,
when applied in high susceptible participants. However, even
though there are strong similarities in the subjective reports of
natural and hypnotic synesthetes, this in not reflected in behav-
ioral similarities. Highly hypnotizable subjects do not gain any
perpetual abilities with a hypnotic suggestion that they did not
have prior to hypnotic induction (Dienes and Perner, 2007).
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